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SURVIVOR PURCHASE AGREEMENTS
AND TAXES*
GEORGE J. LAIKIN**
Businessmen must plan for death as well as for life. This is par-
ticularly true if privately owned and closely held enterprises are to
remain important factors in our economy.'
Because of the failure to make lifetime arrangements for the dis-
position of a decedent's interests therein, businesses are frequently
liquidated or sold at a loss in order to raise money to meet pressing
death charges and taxes. Planning is, therefore, as important for the
surviving business associates as for the decedent's family.
The approach to pre-probate business planning depends upon the
nature of the business, the extent to which the decedent had an interest
therein, whether the business interest constitutes a large or small part
of his estate, and the amount of income available for the support of
his family from sources other than the business involved. While not
every business interest should be sold at death, the welfare of the sur-
viving family often necessitates a sale. The function of the survivor
purchase agreement is to provide the mechanics for such a sale. If
a sale is not to take place at death, the decedent's family can, never-
theless, be protected by a variety of arrangements and safeguards.2
* [Adapted from a paper presented at the annual meeting of the Section of Real
Property, Probate and Trust Law, American Bar Association, August 25th,
1958. Ed.]
** Lawyer, Milwaukee and Chicago; Formerly, Special Assistant to the Attorney
General of the United States-Tax Division; Tax Counsel, Wisconsin State
Association of Life Underwriters; Lecturer, New York University Institute
on Federal Taxation, and other Tax Institutes; Co-Author, ESTATE TAX
TECHNIQUES, and, BAsIC ESTATE PLANNING; Contributor: TAXES, C L U
JOURNAL, TRUSTS AND ESTATES and various other legal periodicals; member
of various tax committees.
Joseph I. Swietlik (LL.M. Harvard) my associate, provided invaluable as-
sistance in the preparation of this paper, which is gratefully acknowledged.
The public policy of our nation-as distinguished from actual practice-favors
the continuation of the small and medium sized business. The anti-trust legis-
lation is an example. The Rev. Act. of 1954, by limiting the transfer for
value rule, by permitting entity buy outs, and by expressly permitting the
accumulation of surplus up to $60,000 is a further example. The "Small
Business Tax Adjustment Bill of 1958," which became part of the "Technical
Amendments Act of 1958," provides faster depreciation of used property,
extensions of the right of corporations to elect to be taxed as partners, and
installment payments of estate taxes over a period of years.2 Arrangements might be made for the widow or children to become active in
the business or otherwise receive income therefrom. Various control and
voting arrangements could be considered. However, if the widow remarries,problems may arise in negotiating business arrangements with the second
husband. Moreover, it might be unfair to require the survivors to continue
to pay even a portion of the profits to the decedent's family when the latter
might contribute little to the operation of the business. From the family's
point of view it may be doubted whether its source of income should be
dependent upon the vagaries and uncertainties of business. See Fuller,
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Sole Proprietorship
Of the several forms of business entities, the sole proprietorship is
most vulnerable. At the death of a sole proprietor, the business be-
comes part of his estate and is under the control of the probate court.3
Usually, it will be sold or liquidated as rapidly as possible. 4 The sole
proprietor should, therefore, through appropriate provisions in his will,
enable his executors to carry on the business until such time as an ad-
vantageous disposition can be made.
Few survivor purchase agreements for sole proprietorship are ex-
ecuted. 5 Because the proprietor has difficulty in finding a successor.
If he does find a suitable one, often a key employee, such individual
is given an interest in the business during lifetime, and the sole pro-
prietorship is converted into a partnership or corporation.
Partnership
The partnership has analogous problems. Under the Uniform
Partnership Act, as well as under the common law, it is automatically
dissolved upon the death of one of the partners, unless an express
agreement to the contrary has been made. While death dissolves a
partnership, it is not actually terminated until its affairs have been
wound up. 6 During this interim, it can undertake no new transactions
or ventures. It may carry on only those transactions necessary to con-
clude its affairs. The surviving partners are regarded as trustees for
the deceased partner's interest, and are responsible as such to the pro-
bate court.7 They are required to account for any profits made. The
deceased partner's interests are not liable for losses incurred by the
survivors as a result of transactions entered into after death.8
Corporation
Fundamentally, the problems of the closely held corporation are
Partnership Agreements for Continuation of an Enterprise After Death of a
Partner, 50 YALE L. J. 202 (1940).
a All assets of the decedent not otherwise exempt are treated as part of the
deceased's estate and pass under the control of the executor or administrator.
21 Am. JUR., Executors & Administrators §§ 185 and 197 (1939).
4 Unless there is an express authority to do so, probate courts frown upon the
operation of a business by an estate. Hall vs. Meriden Trust & Safe Deposit
Co., 103 Conn. 226, 130 Atl. 157 (1925) ; In re Thurbers Estate, 311 Il.
211, 142 N.E. 493 (1924); In re Burke's Estate, 108 Cal. 163, 244 Pac. 340
(1926).
5 Generally, the sale of a sole proprietorship is not a unitary transaction per-
mitting classification of the entire business as a capital asset. Williams v.
McGowan, 152 F.2d 570 (2nd Cir. 1945). Problems arise as to whether pay-
ments for inventory stock in trade, accounts receivable, covenants not to
compete, good will, and similar items will be subject to ordinary income or
capital gain treatment. Furthermore, problems may arise as to the allocation
of the purchase price among the various individuals items acquired.
6 UIrnoRT PARTNERSHIP AcT, §§ 29, 30, and 31.
7 UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT, § 21; Losch v. Marcin, 251 N.Y. 402, 167 N.E.
514 (1929); Fleming v. Fleming, 211 Iowa 1251, 230 N.W. 359 (1930);
Vasiljevich v. Radanovich, 138 Cal. App. 97, 31 P. 2d 802 (1934); Moffet v.
Pierce, 344 Pa. 16, 24 A.2d 448 (1942).
8 UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT, § 34.
[Vol. 42
SURVIVOR PURCHASE AGREEMENTS
the same as those of the partnership, except of course that the cor-
poration does not terminate upon death. The relationship between the
stockholders, the continuity of the business, and the protection of the
decedent's family involve the same consideration.
Elements of Agreement
There are two basic approaches to the purchase of the interests of
a deceased partner or stockholder. Under one, the cross-purchase, the
surviving partners or stockholders make the purchase. Under the other,
the purchase is by the entity-by the partnership or the corporatiin
itself. The determination of which course to follow will depend on
both business and tax considerations.
Pattern of Agreement
The parties to and the provisions of the agreement necessarily de-
pend upon whether the business is a partnership or a corporation, and
whether the buy out is to be by the survivors or by the entity. In any
event, the instrument should be a binding contract. An instrument
embodying only mutual options is not effective. If the agreement is
in the form of an option, it should be based on sufficient consideration
so that if the optionor elects to sell, the optionee is obligated to pur-
chase. 10 A price, or a method of determining it, should be spelled out
with certainty. The method of payment should be set forth.
Wherever possible, the agreement should be funded by life insur-
ance. Because of recent tax confusion there is disagreement as to
whether the insurance should be referred to in the agreement. But,
it would appear that sufficient clarification of the tax problems has
already taken place to minimize the danger of such reference.
If services of a trustee or escow holder are used, provisions relating
thereto should be included, as should provisions relating to the restraint
on the sale or disposition of the shares or business interest. Mechanics
for the settlement of disputes, for certifying the figures reflected by
the books, methods of dealing with problems of the corporation not
having sufficient surplus at the time to buy out, the creation of a sink-
ing fund if needed, and the time within which various steps should be
taken, must be covered.
The agreement may also deal with such problems as voting rights,
voting in concert, control and management, both during lifetime and
after death. Sometimes wives are made parties although they have
no direct interest in the business. There appears to be no legal neces-
sity for this, except possibly in community property states.1 Practi-
9 Comm. v. Bensel. 100 F.2d 639 (3rd Cir. 1938) ; Armstrong's Estate v. Comm.,
146 F.2d 457 (7th Cir. 1945); Cowles v. State of Washington, 219 P. 2d 964(Wash. 1950).10 PAGE, CONTRACTS § 582 (1919); 12 Am. JUR., Contracts § 15 (1938); Misko-
witz v. Starobin, 41 N.Y.S. 2d 786, 267 App. Div. 866 (1943).
"'.Generally, in community property states a wife's signature is essential if, in
1959]
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cally, however, making the wife a party may have the effect of placing
her on notice and reducing her resistance to the implementation of
the agreement if the results are not satisfactory to her.1 2
Enforceability
Agreements providing for the sale of a business interest at death
have generally been upheld by the courts. 1 3 They are usually not re-
garded as testamentary in nature, 1" and are considered to be binding
upon the personal representatives and heirs of the decedent.' 5
Enforceability problems have arisen under a variety of factual situ-
ations.16 Some relate to the adequacy of price; to ambiguity in the method
of arriving at a price; to the right of the corporation to acquire the shares
in view of the absence of surplus; to the absence of good faith; to the
the business purchase, she will receive less than one-half of an adequate pur-
chase price. 2 R & R Advanced Underwriting Service, 15-37 (e).12 Similarly, there is no legal necessity for referring to these agreements in the
wills of the parties. Nevertheless, wills do frequently direct the executors
to carry out the provisions of such agreements. Again, the effect is not alegal one, but a practical one of giving all parties, including the decedent's
family, further notice of his intentions.
13Casey v. Hurley, 112 Conn. 526, 152 Atl. 892 (1931); Rankin v. Newman, 114
Cal. 635, 46 Pac. 742 (1896) ; Kavanaugh v. Johnson, 290 Mass. 587, 195 N.E.797 (1935) ; In re Rohrbacher's Estate, 168 Pa. 158, 32 Atl. 30 (1895)(reversing 14 Pa. Co. Ct. 568, 3 Pa. Dist. R. 264 (1894)) ; In re Eddy's Estate,
175 Misc. 1011, 26 N.Y.S. 2d 115 (1941) ; See also 40 Asi. JUR., Partnerships§ 311 (1942) ; Notes and Cases at 73 A.L.R. 983 (1931) ; Forster, Legal, Tax
and Practical Problens Under Partnership Purchase and Sale Agreement,
19 So. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1945).
14 Murphy v. Murphy, 217 Mass. 233, 104 N.E. 466 (1914) ; In re Fieux's Estate,
241 N.Y. 277, 149 N.E. 857 (1925); McKinnon v. McKinnon, 56 Fed. 409(8th Cir. 1893).
15Lockwoods Trustee v. Lockwood, 250 Ky. 262, 62 S.W. 2d 1053 (1933);
Kavanaugh v. Johnson, 290 Mass. 587, 193 N.E. 797 (1935). This is true
whether or not the purchase price is specified. Rankin v. Newman, 114 Cal.365, 46 Pac. 742 (1896), and whether the agreed price is too high or too low.Kaufmann v. Kaufmann, 222 Pa. 58, 70 Atl. 956 (1908) ; Murphy v. Murphy,
217 Mass. 233, 104 N.E. 466 (1914).16 Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F. 2d 482 (D.C. Cir. 1957), involved the question
of good faith as to bona fide negotiation of price. Cerceo v. DeMarco, 391
Pa. 157, 137 A. 2d 296 (Penn. 1958), deals with the lack of consideration.
The buy out arrangements called for insurance which was never acquired.
The court held that the buy out failed for lack of consideration.Note must also be made of a line of cases decided in New York. In
Topkin, Loring & Schwartz, 249 N.Y. 206, 163 N.E. 735, 66 A.L.R. 1179(1928), Schwartz refused to sell his shares on the ground that since the
corporation could purchase the shares only out of surplus, the agreement was
not binding upon the corporation because there was no assurance that there
would be surplus available when the corporation would be called upon to re-
purchase. The court agreed. The important point to note, however, was
that the agreement did not provide any method for accumulating funds to
pay for the shares. Life insurance was not used.
In Greater New York Carpet House v. Herschmann, 258 App. Div. 649,
17 N.Y.S. 2d 483 (1940), the agreement was funded with insurance purchased
by the corporation. The court held the latter fact to be sufficient to differenti-
ate this case from the Schwartz case. The defense of lack of surplus, if
there were such a lack in spite of the insurance, could be asserted only on
Herschmann's death, but the agreement itself was binding and valid. See
also: Ionic Shop, Inc., v. Rothfeld, 64 N.Y.S. 2d 101 (1946); Murphy v.
Murphy, Inc., 166 N.Y.S. 2d 290 (1957).
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need for a sutiable endorsement on the stock certificates indicating that
the shares were subject to the provisions of the agreement.' Enforce-
ability, in some cases, is by way of specific performance, if the business
interest is unique in nature and damages are not readily ascertainable.
Right of Corporation to Redeem
A number of problems exist with respect to the right of a corpora-
tion to purchase its own shares. The majority rule"s is that a solvent
corporation may lawfully purchase its own shares, in the absence of
express contrary restrictions, provided it acts in good faith and without
prejudice to the rights of creditors, and has a surplus with which to
make the purchase. The statutes of many states now directly permit
the repurchase of stock. 19 Where prohibitions exist, they are intended
for the protection of creditors and for the prevention of discrimination
and favoritism among the stockholders.2 0
Some states merely require that the shares be paid for only out
of surplus.1 Some states permit the creation of surplus by a reduction
of capital.22 Unless creditors would be adversely affected, a provision
in the agreement providing for the creation of surplus by the reduction
of capital would appear to be practical.
It should be noted that life insurance proceeds, if not subject to
the transfer for value rule, are received free of income taxes and, ac-
cordingly, create surplus to the degree that the proceeds are not offset
by existing deficits. Out of such surplus there can be a redemption
of shares.
17 To insure enforceability, the stock certificates should be stamped or endorsed
with a summary of restrictions on the transferability of that stock. If no
Such statement is placed on the certificate, Sec. 15 of the Uniform Stock Actprovides that there shall be no lien in favor of the corporation or restriction
on the transfer.28 See: 6A FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 2845 (1950).
19 See: 2 R & R Advanced Underwriting Service, 15-31, for a breakdown, stateby state, of the requirements with respect to this problem.
20 For example, preemptive rights do not attach to treasury stock. 18 C.J.S.
Corporations § 201(d) (1939), Borg v. International Silver Co., 11 F. 2d 143(2nd Cir. 1926). There is also the danger of an insolvent corporation pur-
chasing shares of favored individuals before dissolution of the corporation.
See also 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 950 (1940).
21 E.g., Ark., Cal., Del., Fla.. Ga., Kan., La., Md., Mfich., Minn., N.H., N.J., N.C.,N.D., Okla., N.Y., Ore., S.D., Tenn., Wis. In some states, such as New York,
this rule is predicated upon court decisions rather than statute. Cross v.Beguelin, 252 N.Y. 262, 169 N.E. 378, aff'g 226 App. Div. 349, 235 N.Y.S.336 (1929) ; Richards v. Ernest Wiener Co., 207 N.Y. 59, 100 N.E. 593 (1912).
The New York Penal Code does, however, provide that a director voting for
the repurchase of corporate shares out of funds other than surplus shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor. NEw YORK PENAL CODE, § 664, as amended by
Laws of 1924, Chap. 221. In Illinois, a corporation may purchase its own
stock provided the redemption will not reduce "the remaining assets of the
corporation below an amount sufficient to pay all debts and known liabilities
of the corporation as they mature.... ." ILLINOIs BuSINESS CORPORATION AcT
1955, § 58. A few states require express statutory or charter provisions before
redemption will be permitted. Petre v. Bruce, 157 Tenn. 131, 7 S.W. 2d 43(1928); Security Nat. Bank v. Crystal Ice & Fuel Co., 145 Kan. 899, 67 P. 2d
527 (1937).
22 E.g., ILLINOIS BusINESS CORPORATION ACv 1955, § 60.
1959]
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Majority v. Minority
Occasionally, the question arises as to whether the majority stock-
holders may cause the corporation to enter into a stock retirement
agreement with them over the objection of the minority. The problem
is, basically, the right of the majority versus the minority. While cor-
porate control vests in the majority, the minority do have certain well
defined rights. They can challenge the action of the majority where
such action may injure the corporation or the minority.23 The majority
may not act for its own benefit to the detriment of the corporation or
the minority.
2 4
The minority has no right, however, to interfere with any action
of the majority taken in good faith and not intended to be injurious.25
Hence, it would seem that a stock retirement agreement between the
corporation and some of its stockholders, if entered into on notice and
in good faith, and with a fair valuation placed upon the shares, could
not be successfully attacked by the minority, even though the latter
voted against such an agreement at corporate meetings.
26
CORPORATE TAX PROBLEMS
Capital Gain Treatment
Those who use the stock redemption approach must be aware of
many tax problems. Ordinarily, the redemption by a corporation of
all of the shares of a stockholder is given capital gains treatment. It
is regarded as a sale or exchange. 27 After death, the same treatment
applies, but gain is measured by the difference between value for estate
tax purposes and the amount realized on the sale.2-0 Normally, however,
if the sale is pursuant to a valid and adequate survivor purchase agree-
ment, there will be no difference between the amount realized on the
sale and the valuation for estate tax purposes. This is true even if there
is a partial redemption under Section 303 (to which reference will
be made later).
Ordinary Income - Attribution Rules
However, if Section 318 applies, a stock redemption may give rise
2 3Weber v. Climax Molybdenum Co., 217 App. Div. 756, 127 Misc. 470, 216
N.Y.S. 481 (1926); Allied Chemical & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co., 14
Del. Ch. 1, 120 Atl. 486 (1923).
24 Duffy v. Omaha Merchants' Express & Transfer Co., 127 Neb. 273, 255 N.W.
1 (1934) ; Henderson v. Garner, 200 Ala. 59, 75 So. 387 (1917).
5Martin Orchard Co. v. Fruit Growers Canning Co., 203 Wis. 97, 233 N.W.
603 (1930); Crowe v. Consolidated Lumber Co., 239 Mich. 300, 214 N.W.
126 (1927).
26 A Corporation may repurchase stock from its employees and officers so long
as the transaction is pursuant to a valid contract and the corporation is not
insolvent. 6 FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 2858 (1950).
27 TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 302(a).
28 Property passing from a decedent receives a stepped-up basis equal to its
fair market value at the time of decedents' death. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 1014(a). Since a decedent's property is valued according to its fair market
value as of the date of death for estate tax purposes, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 2031, that valuation becomes its basis for purposes of subsequent sale.
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to ordinary income rather than a capital gain. Section 318 relates to
the family attribution rules. It is applicable to a corporate situation
where members of the same family-father, wife, children, grandchil-
dren-own shares, whether or not there also are other non-family
stockholders. That section generally also applies where the family mem-
bers are associated in a partnership, as stockholders in another corpora-
tion, or as beneficiaries of a trust or estate. 29 The result is that the
shares of all the family members may be attributed to the one seeking
redemption, so as to make impossible the full redemption of his shares,
unless certain difficult, and often impossibile, tests are met.
Take the case of the Black & White Corporation, with 100 shares
outstanding. Black owns 30 and the White family owns 70. John
White, the father, owns 40 of these 70 shares. His two sons and his
wife each own 10. Assume that White's 40 shares are worth $100,000
and that there is a stock retirement agreement in force, pursuant to
which the corporation is to purchase John White's shares from his
his estate for $100,000.
If White dies, and a purchase of his 40 shares were made pursuant
to the agreement, and assuming that such redemption did not come
under the limited shelter provided by Sectoin 303, the payment by the
corporation to White's estate would constitute a taxable dividend to it.
This is because, under Section 318, the shares owned by Mrs. White
and the two sons would be attributed to Mr. White, and the purchase
of the 40 shares did not qualify as a complete redemption because other
members of the family still owned 30 shares attributed to White, and
because the redemption of 40 of the 70 White shares did not qualify
as a disproportionate partial redemption-a complicated test set forth
in the Code.30
Under these circumstances, the estate would be required to pay an
income tax on a $100,000 dividend. If White's estate were substantial,
it is possible that the income tax, the estate tax and the inheritance tax
might even exceed $100,000.
29 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 318. See Laikin, Stock Redemption: 302 and 318,
N.Y.U. 14TH INST. ON FED. TAX 671 (1955). The related entity rules at-
tribute ownership to the stockholder of his ratable portion of the shares owned
by any partnership, trust, or estate of which he is a member or beneficiary;
also, all of the shares of the trust of which he is considered the owner for
income tax purposes, also the shares owned by a corporation with respect to
which he owns, directly or by attribution, 50% of the value of its outstanding
shares. Conversely, all of the shares of the stockholder are attributed to his
children, spouse, parents, grandparents, and to a partnership, trust, estate, or
corporation of which he is a member or beneficiary, but his shares -will only
be attributed to the corporation if he owns more than 50% of the stock
thereby of value.
30 There can be disproportionate partial redemption with respect to a share-
holder if the percentage-ratio of his voting stock after redemption is at least
20% less than his percentage-ratio of voting stock prior to the redemption;
and, his remaining voting shares constitute less than 50% of the outstanding
voting shares after the redemption.
1959]
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This type of danger is present with almost every stock retirement
agreement where more than one member of the family is a stockholder.
However, the attribution rules do not apply as between brothers, unless
their parents are also stockholders, or the brothers are beneficiaries of
the same trust or estate, or are stockholders in another corporation
which holds shares in the one which is to make the redemption.
Some attention is now being given by Congressional Committees,
and committees of the various professional groups, to ameliorate these
difficulties. However, the changes recommended are limited in scope,
so that the basic problems of Section 318 may still remain. 1
Danger in Existing Stock Retirement Agreements
The foregoing problems are aggravated by the fact that in recent
years there has been considerable estate planning. In connection there-
with, many gifts of stock in closely held corporations have been made
to children, to spouses and to trusts for them. This suggests that where
a situation involves the attribution rules of Section 318, the safest
approach to avoid dividend treatment, if a buy out is required, is to
use the cross purchase.
3 2
On the other hand, an agreement could be drawn in the form of a
binding option which would give the estate the option to cause the
corporation to redeem all or part of its shares. Such an agreement
would have the advantage of enabling the estate to determine whether
or not it would be safe, taxwise, to enforce a redemption. Such an
agreement might also provide that surviving stockholders shall person-
ally acquire the shares to the extent that the corporation is unable to,
or does not, make the purchase. 33
Existing stock retirement agreements which may be vulnerable un-
der Section 318 also present the danger that the surviving stockholders
may insist on carrying out the agreement by a sale to the corporation,
regardless of the income tax consequences to the decedent's estate.
Section 303 Redemptions
Section 303 provides that at death a corporation may redeem such
number of shares held by an estate which will provide the estate with
an amount sufficient to cover the estate and inheritance taxes, and ad-
ministrative costs, without causing the amount received to be taxed
31 For a discussion of expected changes see: 7 J. TAXATION 66 (Aug. 1958).
32See Rev. Rul. 58-111, 1958 INT. REv. BULL. No. 12 at 9, providing that in the
event of the redemption of stock of a corporation where § 318(a) is applied
to determine the constructive ownership of stock for the purposes of § 302,
the beneficiaries proportionate interests in the stock owned by an estate would
be determined as of the date of redemption. This would allow one beneficiary
to receive his share before redemption and prevent attribution between the
beneficiary and the estate. It further suggsts that the distribution from the
estate to the various beneficiaries might be so timed that at the time of re-
demption the 302 and 318 rules will be voided.
33 However, if the estate has the option the price fixed in the agreement may
not necessarily be acceptable to the government as fixing the value for estate
tax purposes.
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as a dividend. The attribution rules of Section 318 do not apply to
shares redeemed under Section 303."4
Section 303 applies where the shares of the particular corporation
held by the estate constitute 35% of the gross estate, or 50% of the
taxable estate. Where the shares of more than one corporation are to
be redeemed, the estate must own 75% of the outstanding stock of
each corporation, in which case the 35% and 50% rules apply to the
combination. 35
While Section 303 provides a degree of relief in given cases, it
does not function automatically. Unless a proposed redemption is sup-
ported by an agreement, the corporation and the surviving stockholders
may refuse to carry out the redemption. If a partial redemption does
take place, it may convert a majority position to a minority one. If
insurance is used to fund a redemption but there is no agreement with
respect thereto, and if the parties fail to agree on value, the redemption
may not take place, with the result that the insurance may actually
have the effect of increasing the value of the shares for tax purposes.
PARTNERSHIP TAX PROBLEMS
Income Tax
Death does not itself terminate the income tax year of a partnership
unless the agreement expressly so provides. However, the sale of a
partnership interest will terminate the tax year with respect to the
seller, and if the sale involves more than a 509 interest, it will termi-
nate the tax year of the partnership for all of the partners. 36 Failure
to recognize these rules may result in the bunching of income of an
entire partnership year with that of a partial year, thus increasing the
individual's applicable brackets. This might occur where one partner
is on a calendar year basis, the partnership is on a fiscal year basis,
and pursuant to agreement his interest is sold at death. The better
practice, in proper situations, is to have the sale take place after death
and have the income for the short fiscal period reportable by the estate.
Perhaps some of this income could be paid out as a deductible widow's
allowance, thus bringing about a lowering of brackets, and, if the in-
come is substantial, it may also be advantageous to take some of the
administration expenses as deductions.
If the purchase is between partners, capital gains treatment usually
results.3 7 If the entity approach (purchase by the partnerships) is used,
there could be either capital gain or ordinary income treatment, de-
34 TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 303 makes no reference to § 318 which only applies
if such reference is made, § 318(a).
35 TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 303 (b) (1) (B).
36 TNT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 708(b).
37 TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 741. However, there is a specific exception to capital
gain treatment in that unrealized receivables and substantially appreciated
inventory will be subject to ordinary gain. These terms are defined in the
"collapsible partnership" section, TNT. RaV. CODE OF 1954, § 751.
1959]
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pending upon whether there is a purchase and sale of the partnership
interest as a whole, or whether the purchase is via a continuation of
the sharing of partnership income.38
If the buyers desire an income tax deduction, the buy out must
be couched in terms of a continuation of income. In such event, the
income will be taxable to the recipient as ordinary income and not as
capital gains39 This approach is usually applicable where the entity
purchases rather than the partners. Thus, if the surviving partners
are in a high income tax bracket, it might be advantageous for them
to use the income type rather than the capital transaction type of agree-
ment. This will reduce their income taxes and they might be willing
to pass on some of the savings to the decedent's estate or family.40
Collapsible Partnership
Either approach may involve the new collapsible partnership rules
which may negate capital gain treatment to the extent that the partner-
ship interest contains unrealized accounts receivable or substantially
appreciated inventories.41 In addition, with respect to partnerships
operating on a cash basis, such as a professional partnership, the amount
of the accounts receivable included in the partnership interest sold may
be regarded as income with respect to a decedent, and be subject to
ordinary income taxes to the estate. 42
s § 736(a) provides for ordinary income treatment to the seller if the purchase
price is determined ". . . with regard to the income of the partnership . . ."
or if the purchase price constitutes a ". . . guaranteed payment described in
section 707(c) .... ." § 707(c) refers to guaranteed payments determined
without regard to the income of the partnership made to a partner for services
or the use of capital.
:019 NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 736(a) and 736(b).
40 It should be noted that professional or service partnership agreements gener-
ally proceed under § 736(a).
41 If the income approach under § 736(a) is used, clearly all of the partnership
assets, including unrealized receivables and substantially appreciated inventory
will be subject to ordinary income treatment. If the capital transaction ap-
proach is used, unrealized receivables are specifically excluded from capital
gain treatment by § 736(b) (2) (A). Once it has been determined that a
payment for a partnership interest is a distribution under § 736(b), as dis-
tinguished from a distributive share or a guaranteed payment under § 736(a),
then references must be made to § 731 which provides that a "distribution"
is a "sale or exchange" and thus entitled to capital gain treatment. However,
§ 731(c) specifically excludes § 751 items (unrealized receivables and sub-
stantially appreciated inventory) from capital gain treatment.
42 If the income approach under § 736(a) is used, clearly all of the partnership
assets, including unrealized receivables and substantially appreciated inventory
will be subject to ordinary income treatment. If the capital transaction ap-
proach is used, unrealized receivables are specifically excluded from capital
gain treatment by § 736(b) (2) (A). Once it has been determined that a
payment for a partnership interest is a distribution under § 736(b), as dis-
tinguished from a distributive share or a guaranteed payment under § 736(a),
then references must be made to § 731 which provides that a "distribution"
is a "sale or exchange" and thus entitled to capital gain treatment. However,
§ 731 (c) specifically excludes § 751 items (unrealized receivables and sub-
stantially appreciated inventory) from capital gain treatment.
42 § 753 makes it clear that payments made under § 7 36(a) are income in respect
to a decedent. Since § 736(b) (2) (A) places unrealized receivables under
[Vol. 42
SURVIVOR PURCHASE AGREEMENTS
Stepped-Up Basis
Where the cross purchase approach is used, the surviving partners
will be entitled to a basis for the interest purchased equal to their
cost. The assets in the hands of the partnership allocable to the interest
purchased may also receive a stepped-up basis if the election under
Section 754 is in effect. 43 If the partnership itself purchases and such
election is in effect, the basis of the partnership property will likewise
be adjusted in relation to the amount paid, pursuant to Section 734.
Thus, the partners may receive a stepped-up basis for such assets
through the partnership. This applies whether accumulated partner-
ship income is used for the purchase, the partners contribute addi-
tional cash, or insurance proceeds are received and used for such pur-
pose. But, if insurance proceeds are used, the agreement should pre-
clude the allocation of any part thereof to the deceased partner's in-
terest.
44
Partnership survivor purchase agreements must also cover the issue
of good will, both for the purpose of properly evaluating the worth
of the partnership's interest, and with respect to tax consequences.
Under the present Code,45 if the selling price of the partnership inter-
est exceeds the fair value thereof, the difference will be taxed as ordi-
nary income unless the agreement specifically provides that such dif-
ference represents good will, in which event it will be treated as a capi-
tal asset. Thus, the agreement should indicate that good will is in-
cluded or that no good will exists.
LIFE INSURANCE
Life insurance usually furnishes the most practical method of
providing money with which to fund a survivor purchase agreement.
The parties to such an agreement have an insurable interest in each
§ 736(a), there is little doubt but that unrealized receivables -will, in all suchpartnership transactions, be considered as income in respect to a decedent
and consequently be subject to ordinary income treatment. It should be notedthat § 753 does not make mention of unrealized receivables and substantially
appreciated inventory when the partnership interest is sold to the surviving
partners (as distinguished from a sale to the partnership itself). However,
since these items are specifically given ordinary income treatment under§§ 741 and 751, and since they do amount to assets in the hands of thedeceased partner and as such must be valued in his estate, there is little doubtbut that such items are also income in respect of a decedent.
4 § 754 permits the partnership to file an election and obtain adjustments tothe basis of property which it holds when there has been a distribution of
partnership property under § 734 or when there has been a transfer of a
partnership interest under § 743.
44 § 704(b) automatically allocates part of the tax exempt income, such as in-
surance proceeds, to the deceased partner unless some other allocation is
made, either in the partnership agreement or between the partners. There-fore, the agreement should provide that none of the insurance proceeds be
allocated to the deceased partner and thus increase his partnership valua-
tion. Of course, this can be overcome by an appropriate formula in the
agreement for the valuation of the interest.
4' INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 736(b) (2) (B).
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other. 6 Premiums paid are not deductible for income tax purposes.4"
They are not deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses. 4
However, the proceeds of policies paid by reason of death are not
taxable as income, 49 unless the policies were transferred for value.5°
A transfer for value could take place in connection with a cross
purchase agreement between stockholders where the survivors acquire
the policies owned by the decedent on their own lives. In this respect
the 1954 Code has changed the old transfer for value rule so that the
income tax no longer attaches to the proceeds of policies which are
transferred between members of a partnership, between a partnership
and the members thereof and vice versa, or between a corporation and
its stockholders. Unfortunately, the rule was not made broad enough
to exempt transfers between stockholders. 5'
Premiums Generally Not Dividends
While the so-called "premium payment test" was eliminated from
the law by the 1954 Code, the government is seeking to achieve an
analogous result by taxing as income to the stockholders the premiums
paid by the corporation for insurance on their lives. A series of recent
cases, Casale,52 Prunier,53 and Sanders,5 4 each presented a unique situ-
46 Fleming v. Fleming, 194 Iowa 71, 184 N.W. 296 (1921) ; Atkins v. Cotter,
145 Ark. 326, 224 S.W. 71 (1920) ; Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. vs. Luchs,
102 U.S. 498 (1883) ; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591 (1885).
This is in accord with the general rule that an insurable interest exists if
the purchaser of insurance derives some benefit from the life of the insured,
or will suffer some loss or detriment at his death. Warnock v. Davis, 104
U.S. 775 (1882); Mutual Aid Union vs. Stephens, 97 Okla. 283, 223 Pac.
648 (1924). The members of a partnership or a closed corporation thus
clearly would have an insurable interest in each other's lives. Rohders v.
Peoples Bank, 113 Minn. 496, 130 N.W. 16 (1911); Keckley v. Coshocton
Glass Co., 86 Ohio 213, 99 N.E. 299 (1912). The same reasoning would
also apply to a corporation and its stockholders where continuity and proper
management may depend upon preventing the sale or devolution of decedent's
interest to outsiders.
47 TNT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 264.
48 Nussbaum v. Comm., 19 B.T.A. 868 (1930).
49 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §101.
0 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 101 (a) (2).
51 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 101(a) (2) specifically states that if the transfer of
life insurance is to the insured, to a partner of the insured, to a partnership
in which the insured is a member, or to a corporation in which the insured
is a shareholder or officer, such transfer, even though it be for a valuable
consideration, will not cause the proceeds to be taxed as ordinary income.
It should be noted that under this section a transfer between one shareholder
and another shareholder, who is not the insured, will cause the proceeds to
be subject to income tax.
52 Casale v. Comm., 247 F. 2d 440 (2nd Cir. 1957), rev'g 26 T.C. 1020. A 98%
shareholder entered into a personal retirement contract with his corporation
calling for payment after he reached the age of 65. The corporation then
took out retirement insurance which in turn was payable in the same manner
as the contract of retirement. However, the contract did not refer to the in-
surance. The Court of Appeals held that the premiums were not income to
the shareholder because the corporation was not a sham; it had a valid busi-
ness purpose; and it derived benefit from the insurance. See: Casale Reversed,
7 J. TAXATION 258 (Nov. 1957) ; Laikin, Alter Ego, Life Insurance and Taxes,
7 C.L.U. JOURNAL 32 (Dec. 1952).
[Vol. 42
SURVIVOR PURCHASE AGREEMENTS
ation in which unconventional insurance arrangements were used. The
trial court held, in each case, that the premiums constituted dividend
income to the stockholders who were insured. But, in each case, the
appellate court, looking to substance, as distinguished from form, con-
sidered the business purposes behind the arrangements, noted the ad-
vantages to the corporations, was cognizant of the fact that there were
also advantages to the stockholders, but refused to weigh the relative
advantages to each. Having found a business purpose and advantages
to the corporations, the courts refused to disregard the corporate en-
tity, 5 regarded the insurance as corporate assets, and held that the
premiums were not taxable income to the stockholders.
These holdings have confirmed the traditional method of handling
life insurance under corporate stock retirement agreements, to-wit:
That the corporation should own the policy, be the beneficiary thereof,
and pay the premiums. Had the parties in these three cases complied
with these well established principls, the arrangements would probably
never have been challenged by the Revenue Service.
53Prunier v. Comm., 248 F. 2d 818 (1st Cir. 1957), rev'g 28 T.C. 19. Two brothers
who were the sole shareholders, each took out insurance on his own life and
made the insurance payable to his own estate. The minutes of the corporation
stated that the insurance was to buy out the stock of the first to die. The
corporation then paid the premiums on the insurance. It was held that the
premiums were not income to the two brothers. The court found that the
corporation, by virtue of the notations in the minutes, was the equitable owner
of the policies under state law. Once the court reached this point it merely
reiterated the rules laid down in the Casale case. The court refused to weigh
the benefit conferred on the shareholder as compared with the benefit con-
ferred on the corporation. Prunier Reversed, 8 J. TAXATION 12 (Jan. 1958).
54 Sanders v. Fox, 253 F. 2d 860 (10th Cir. 1958), -rev'g 149 F. Supp. 942. The
corporation took out insurance on the lives of its four shareholders and paid
the premiums thereon. The shareholders had entered into a contract with
the corporation whereby they could designate the beneficiaries of the in-
surance. The Court of Appeals held that the premiums paid were not taxable
as income to the shareholders, because the policies were corporate assets
subject to creditors at all times. The court refused to weigh the benefits con-ferred on the shareholders as compared with the benefits conferred on the
corporation. It merely stated that there was a benefit conferred on the cor-poration which was sufficient. Sanders Reversed, 8 J. TAXATIOiN 322 (June
1958).
If it is found that the survivors are the owners of the policies, then thepremiums paid by the corporation are taxable as dividends to the survivors.Paramount-Richards Theatres, Inc. v. Comm., 153 F. 2d 602 (5th Cir. 1946).
Doran v. Comm., 246 F. 2d 934 (9th Cir. 1957), implies the same thing.
55 But see Comm. v. Bonwit, 87 F. 2d 764 (2nd Cir. 1937), where the chief stock-holder caused the company to take out insurance on his life. The proceeds
were payable to his children, and the right to change beneficiaries was not
reserved. It was held that the premiums paid by the corporation amounted
to taxable income to the chief stockholder. The danger of this case lies in
the fact that although the insurance policy seems to be an asset of the cor-
poration, which is available to general creditors, yet the court reached the
result that the corporation had no ownership in the policy. It is true that
other acts indicate that the parties treated the premiums as additional com-pensation. For example, the premiums were deducted as additional com-
pensation by the corporation. The corporation had none of the incidents of
ownership. It had no right to change beneficiaries, no right to make a loan
against the policy, and no right to receive dividends.
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Effect of Redemption on Surviving Stockholders
While the government's attack along this front appears to have
been repulsed, it has launched another assault in a different area. It
has contended that where the corporation redeems the shares of one
stockholder, the remaining stockholders receive constructive dividends
to the extent of the amount paid to the retiring stockholder. It has
taken this approach in Zipp56 and Holsey.5 7 Although the government's
position in the Zipp case has been affirmed, the Holsey case has been
reversed. 5 In reversing the Holsey case, the court distinguished the
Zipp case by classifying the Zipp case as a situation where the cor-
poration discharged an obligation of the stockholder in redeeming the
shares of another stockholder. 59 No such obligation on the part of the
stockholder was found to exist in the Holsey case. The court rejected
the government's contention that the redemption of one shareholder's
stock constituted a taxable dividend to the remaining shareholders.
The government is not applying for certiorari and therefore is pre-
sumably acquiescing in the result.
Furthermore, if the government's position were ultimately upheld,
it would make meaningless much of Section 302 which undertakes to
set forth rules under which there may be a redemption of stock on a
capital gains basis. A conventionally prepared stock retirement agree-
56 28 T.C. 314, aff'd May 21, 1958 (6th Cir.).
57 28 T.C. 962, reversed Sept. 3, 1958 (3rd Cir.).
58 In the Zipp case the father owned 48 of the 50 shares. The other two were
owned by the sons. However, 46 of the 48 shares were in the names of his
two sons, endorsed in blank, and not in the sons' possession. The father
then gave up his interest in the 46 shares of stock and transferred his re-
maining two shares to the corporation in return for a large payment of cash
made by the corporation. The court held that the payment by the corporation
amounted to a constructive dividend to the two sons and taxed each son on
one-half of the payment made. The court generally held that there was no
business purpose in this redemption and that the only persons who benefited
therefrom were the two sons.
In the Holsey case, Holsey transferred his option to purchase stock to the
corporation. The corporation exercised the option, redeemed the other out-
standing shares, and left -olsey as the sole shareholder. The trial court held
that since Holsey and not the corporation was primarily benefited by the trans-
action, such redemption constituted a taxable dividend to Holsey. The ap-
pellate court first determined that the option did not constitute an obligation
to purchase the retiring shareholder's stock, and there was, therefore, no
obligation on Holsey's part which the corporation was discharging by re-
deeming such stock. The court then stated that although the redemption of
one shareholder's stock may increase the value of another shareholder's
stock, no income is realized to the surviving shareholder until an actual
distribution is made. The position of the appellate court is in accord with
reasoning found in Zens v. Zuinliven, 213 F. 2d 914 (6th Cir. 1954); Tucker
v. Comm., 226 F. 2d 177 (8th Cir. 1955), reversing Tucker, 23 T.C. 115; Ray
Edenfield, 19 T.C. 13 (1952).
59 If the surviving stockholders are obligated to buy out the interest of the
deceased shareholder and the corporation makes such payment for them, the
amount of the payment will be taxable as a dividend to the surviving share-
holders. Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1 (1935) ; Wall v. U.S., 164 F. 2d
462 (4th Cir. 1947); Lowenthal, et al, 169 F. 2d 694 (7th Cir. 1948); Byers
v. Comm., 199 F. 2d 273 (8th Cir. 1952).
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ment should preclude any danger of a constructive dividend. In any
event, the possibility of such danger is not present under a cross pur-
chase agreement to which the corporation is not a party. 0
Settlement Options
Life insurance used for a survivor purchase agreement is sometimes
programmed under the settlement options."' The purpose is to give
the decedent's widow the advantage which attaches to funds admin-
istered by the insurance company and paid out on an installment basis,
as well as the additional advantage of some tax free interest. Prior
to the 1954 Code, this approach was of greater significance. Now, the
tax free interest is limited to $1,000 per year, and only to payments
received by the widow.6 2
Where the use of options is desired, these guides should be fol-
lowed: The arrangement should permit the survivor-the owner of
the policy-to collect the proceeds if he finds it necessary or desirable
to do so, thus enabling him to obtain the business interest by tendering
the insurance cash therefor. The arrangement must be such that the
estate of the decedent will not be confronted with additional tax bur-
dens through possible loss of a part of the marital deduction. If a
trustee is used, it must be protected against possible tax liabilities and
claims of creditors, and must be given protection, through objective
standards, for the exercise of its right of election as to whether the
cash should be drawn down or the settlement options permitted to be-
come effective.
It is believed that if appropriately handled, such settlement option
arrangements are not adversely affected by Casale, Prunier, and
Sanders, particularly since the courts have not sustained the govern-
ment's contention.
Reference to Insurance in Agreement
While there is a divergence of opinion as to whether a survivor
purchase agreement should refer to the insurance used to fund it, it
is believed that if the agreement is well drawn and reflects a sound
business purpose, there is no danger in referring to the insurance.
Such reference relates to only one of the economic aspects of the ar-
60 Legallet v. Comm., 41 B.T.A. 294 (1940), should be noted. In that case, two
partners each took out insurance payable to their respective wives and chil-
dren. When partner B died his wife received the proceeds of the insurance,
which amounted to $20,000. Partner A then paid an additional $30,000 to
B's estate for his interest in the partnership. It had been previously agreed
between A and B that the insurance would be applied toward the purchase
of a deceased party's partnership interest. The partnership itself paid the
premiums on the insurance. Later, when A wanted to sell the partnership,
he claimed a basis for the interest purchased from B of $50,000. The Board
of Tax Appeals held that A was not entitled to step up his basis by the
amount of the insurance which B had on his own life because that amount
was not paid by A.6 1Laikin, Settlement Options and Survivor Agreements, 4 C.L.U. JOURNAL 199
(June 1950).62 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 101(d).
1959]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
rangement required to make the agreement workable. In any event,
if the doctrine of substance as distinguished from form is recognized,
tax dangers will not depend merely on absence of reference if, in fact,
insurance is used to fund the agreement. Nevertheless, an effective
agreement may be drawn without such reference.
Problems Relating to Insurance Arrangements
The use of insurance for funding purposes has a bearing on whether
the cross purchase or the entity approach should be used. Practical
as well as tax considerations are involved.
Where there are several parties, a cross purchase agreement may
become unwieldy. Each must procure insurance on the lives of others.
Notwithstanding the amelioration of the transfer for value rule63
relating to partners-but not to stockholders-the transfer of many
policies on the lives of the surviving partners from the decedent's
estate to each of them may become complex.6 4
Financing insurance under a cross purchase arrangement presents
another problem. It is usually easier for the entity to pay the premiums.
For example, it is less burdensome to pay premiums out of surplus
than for the individual stockholders to pay them out of salaries sharply
depleted by taxes. While such premiums are not deductible,65 they do
constitute a legitimate application of surplus profits.66 The accumula-
tion of funds, through life insurance, to carry out a commitment under
a stock retirement agreement designed to preserve the management and
continuity of the business in the event of a death, should not be chal-
lengeable under Section 531 as an unreasonable accumulation of
surplus.6
7
Under a stock retirement agreement, the proportionate interests of
the surviving stockholders are not affected by the redemption of the
shares of the decedent. Under a cross purchase arrangement, the
resulting relationship depends entirely upon the proportion each sur-
vivor has agreed to purchase. In the one case the result is automatic;
in the other, it stems from negotiation.
63 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 101 (a) (2).
64 The mechanical problem of multiple policies under cross purchase arrangements
could be resolved through the means of an agency or a trusteeship for the
ownership of the policies on all of the partners, but such an arrangement
would probably not solve any of the tax problems implicit therein. The trans-
fer for value rule still applies to the transfer of the policies between stock-holders, and the application of the rule could very likely not be avoided,
notwithstanding the use of an agency or a trusteeship.
63 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 264.
66 Emeloid Co., Inc. v. Comm., 189 F. 2d 230 (3rd Cir. 1951), rev'g 14 T.C. 1295
(1950).
67 See Millet, Key Man Life Insurance and Section 102, 1 C.L.U. JOURNAL 462.
The view that the use of life insurance to fund these agreements should not
be challengeable under Sec. 531 is further supported by Diamond Life BulletinService. The most recent case, Pelton Steel Casting Co. v. Commissioner,
-F (2d) - (7th Cir. 1958), 58-1 U.S.T.C. Para. 9179, aff'g 28 T.C.
153, has created some confusion in this area. It is treated at length below.
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Often the interest of the individual which is to be purchased repre-
sents a large one, and those who are to buy represent a smaller interest.
The lesser interest will have difficulty paying premiums with respect
to the former. The problem is aggravated if the larger interest is held
by a much older individual, with a substantially higher premium rate.
These difficulties sometimes preclude the use of the cross purchase
arrangement although they can be ameliorated, to a degree, by the loan
of monies from one party to the other to enable the latter to pay
premiums, and by the use of some of the newer modes of financing
insurance premiums. In any event, these difficulties are lessened where
the entity approach is used. But, the entity approach gives rise to an-
other type of inequity. Thus, the 75% stockholder or partner would
in effect be contributing 75% of the premiums with respect to insur-
ance on his own life, the proceeds of which are to be used to buy out
his interest.
It has been suggested that this problem can be solved by including
in the valuation formula the cash surrender value of all of the insur-
ance policies, plus the proceeds from the decedent's policies. s If
there were numerous individuals involved, this approach might be
feasible. However, if there are only two or three individuals, the in-
clusion of the proceeds would increase the value of the business inter-
est, making necessary the purchase of even more insurance for funding
purposes.6 9 Thus, inequities due to premium payments may result,
even though the entity approach is used. But perhaps the risk of such
inequities is justified by the greater ease of accomplishing the buy out
through the entity.
Where No Insurance
Situations where some of the parties are uninsurable call for the
payment of the purchase price in installments over a suitable period
of time. Where the corporation redeems, it might be practical to issue
preferred stock for the common stock acquired.7 0 Sinking funds might
be developed. Since the business purpose of such an agreement is be-
yond question, the moderate and reasonable development of a sinking
fund should not be challenged as being an unreasonable accumulation
of surplus.
The Pelton case,71 however, has a direct bearing on this conclu-
68 See: Churchill, Achieving Equity Under Entity Purchase Agreements, INsUR-
ANCE RESEARCH & REvIEw SERVimcE, INC. (1955).
60 For statistics and examples bearing these facts out, see 94 TRUSTS AND Es-
TATES 284 (April 1955).7oMany types of corporate arrangements may be set up depending upon the
facts of each individual case. These arrangements may vary from a simple
stock transfer to a complete corporate reorganization. The main objective
in most such arrangements would be to transfer voting control out of the
hands of the decedent's estate to the survivors.
71Pelton Steel Casting Co. v. Comm., - F. 2d - (7th Cir. 1958), 58-1
U.S.T.C. Para. 9179, aff'g 28 T.C. 153.
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sion. That case involved a lifetime buy out of two stockholders holding
80% of the shares. The facts showed a major shift in position from
one wherein the corporation was regularly paying dividends, to an-
other where it ceased paying dividends, with the obvious purpose of
accumulating cash so that these controlling stockholders could liquidate
their holdings on a capital gains basis. There was difficulty in finding
a valid business purpose behind the bail-out of these principal stock-
holders. Accordingly, while the Pelton case may seem to challenge the
conclusion stated, it is believed that it will not be controlling or have
significant influence in cases wherein sinking funds are gradually built
up to cover a buy out at death.
In a cross purchase situation where life insurance is not available,
the surviving business associates must obligate themselves personally
to pay for the interests of the decedent. Such obligations may compli-
cate their personal estate programs and threaten the security of their
families, particularly if a succession of deaths takes place. In some
situations, it may be better to liquidate the business than to assume the
personal obligation of paying for decedent's interest.
VALUATION
There is no method of valuation equally applicable to all businesses.
Each has its own special problems and unique characteristics. There-
fore, only basic and general considerations can be reviewed here.7 2
Book Value
Resort to book value is undoubtedly the simplest method of valuing
a business interest. Yet book value can be inaccurate, unfair, and eco-
nomically meaningless. Book value does not reflect the appreciation
or depreciation of assets, the worth of hidden assets, of intangibles,
of earning power and of good will. It may, however, frequently be
used as a point of departure in the development of a more accurate
valuation.
Where book value is used, it should be determined as of a date
previous to death, either as of the close of the fiscal year or of the
month preceding death. This tends to eliminate suspicion as to ad-
justments of books after death in order to minimize value. If a date
previous to death is used, fairness might dictate, depending on the
kind of business, that there be an adjustment for profits, losses or
drawings up to the time of death. Book value should be determined
by an outside accountant and the agreement should expressly provide
that his findings are to be conclusive and binding upon the parties.7 3
72 For a general discussion of valuation problems see: Forster & Willis, How
to Draft a Partnership Buy and Sell Agreement, 56 So. CALIF. TAX INST.
59; Rev. Rul. 54-77, 1954-1 Cum. BULL. 187; See also Rockerfeller, Valuation
of Closely Held Stocks for Estate and Gift Tax Purposes, 36 TAXES 259(April 1958), where such questions as when the market is not representative
of the true values, and questions of the blockage problem, are discussed.
73 The difficulties and dangers involved in adjusting as of the date of death
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Good Will
If the business is one to which good will attaches, book value is an
inadequate standard of valuation. On the other hand, the business
may be one to which good will does not attach. Good will might exist
only during the lifetime of the individual whose interest is purchased.
This is particularly true of a professional practice where good will
is so personal as to cease at death.7 4 In any event, if the facts so
require, the agreement should expressly indicate that the parties regard
the business as being one which has no good will. Disputes and litiga-
tion between the parties75 and with the tax authorities"6 may result if
if this is overlooked.
The value of good will is basically dependent upon the earnings
and prospects of a business. Its value represents a capitalization of
earning power. This theory is applied by the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice.7 7  Under it, the amount of earnings attributable to good will is
computed by (1) ascertaining the average annual net earnings of the
business; (2) ascertaining the value of tangible assets; (3) subtracting
from the total net earnings the earnings attributable to tangible prop-
erty, and (4) capitalizing the balance.78
For some businesses, a simple method of valuing good will might
be used. The parties might agree that the good will is worth two (or
the book value determined as of a date previous thereto, can largely be
avoided by the following technique: The balance sheet of the previous date
is used as a starting point. Certain items are accepted at the figures that
appear thereon. Others are adjusted as of the date of death. Thus cash and
cash items are taken at their face value as of the date of death. Securities
held at death are taken at their then market value. Accounts receivable, if
reserves are inadequate, may be taken at 90% (e.g.) of the amounts thereof
at death. Fixed assets, furniture and equipment could be valued at their
replacement value at death as determined by appraisers. Real estate could
likewise be valued at death by appraisal. The value of the inventory at death
would be determined by adding to the book value of the inventory appearing
on the previous balance sheet of the purchases from the date thereof to the
date of death and subtracting therefrom the sales as reduced by the average
mark-up for the same period. All other items on the balance sheet will be
accepted at the figures that appear thereon.7 4 Cf. Hoping v. Comm., P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 575 (1947); O-Rear v. Comm.,
80 F. 2d 472 (6th Cir. 1935).75 Lanske v. Lanske, 95 Pa. Super. 590 (1928) ; Kaufman v. Kaufman, 222 Pa.
58, 70 At. 596, aff'd 239 Pa. 42, 86 Atl. 634 (1913).
76 See Rev. Rul. 157, 1953-2 Cui. BULL. 255; Estate of Trammell, 18 T.C. 662
(1952), holding that if there is no provision in the agreement for evaluating
the good will, and no mention of it, the Commissioner is free to place a
value thereon for estate tax purposes.
77 See A.R.M. 34, 2 Cum. BULL. 31 (1920). For general discussion of problems
relating to valuing good will, see 24 TAXES 1158 (1946) ; 25 TAxEs 876 (1947);
MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §§ 59.35-59.44 (1958).78 In applying this formula, a number of difficulties arise. Among them are the
determination of the proper rate of return to be derived from the tangibles,
the number of years over which the earnings are to be averaged, whether
the earnings shall be before or after taxes, whether certain years shall be
excluded because they are abnormal, and the rate by which the earnings
attributable to good will shall be capitalized. The determination of the proper
rate of capitalization requires the exercise of sound business judgment. It
has also been the subject of much tax litigation.
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any number) times the average annual earnings over a given number of
years. This method avoids the necessity of allocating earnings be-
tween tangibles and intangibles. It proves satisfactory and fair in
many situations, particularly where good will and other intangibles
are more important to the business than fixed assets. 79
Subjective Approach
The approach to placing a value on a business may be either ob-
jective or subjective. The subjective motivation-the desire to protect
the decedent's family rather than the business-frequently outweighs
the objective. To meet this situation, the agreement might provide that
the parties shall agree, in writing, at regular intervals, as to the value
to be used if a death takes place before the next valuation date.80
The weakness of this method, however, is that the parties may
neglect to re-evaluate periodically as required. Moreover, it may be
awkward to discuss a re-evaluation, particularly if the revision is to
be downward, while one of the parties to the agreement is seriously
ill. Hence, in practice, it is better to provide for an automatic formula
type of valuation.
Outside Offer
To guard against the possibility that the value arrived at pursuant
to the agreement may prove unfair because of unforeseen circum-
stances, provision may be made permitting the decedent's estate to
seek an outside offer for the purchase of the entire business. If the
outside offer is greater than the value determined under the agreement,
the survivors must elect either to pay for the decedent's interest on
the basis of such outside offer, or to sell the entire business to the
offeror. This arrangement is essentially fair. It protects the estate
of the decedent and, at the same time, it permits the survivors to re-
tain the business by paying a higher price. If the outside offer repre-
sents an amount greater than the survivors think wise to pay, they,
too, can sell and receive the benefits of the high selling price.,,
70 In some cases it may be possible to value the entire business interest, instead of
the good will alone, by the capitalization of earnings method. This method is
particularly applicable to a service business and to one wherein tangible assets
are not of paramount importance.10 It may then provide that the value set forth in the last valuation agreement
prior to death shall determine the amount to be paid. The valuation thus
determined will not differentiate between tangible and intangible assets. Such
items as hidden assets, the depreciation or appreciation of values and all
other factors affecting value may be reflected in the lump sum figure without
identification. Book value will serve no more than as a guide to the value
of some of the factors. Audits and inventory taking are avoided. If under
the circumstances of a particular case, it is desirable to determine book value
and good will separately, the simple method suggested above can be used with
respect to good will alone. The frequency of the periodic valuations must
depend upon the nature of the business. In one that fluctuates rapidly, month-
ly or quarterly valuations may be necessary. In others, semi-annual or annual
valuations may be adequate.
S Agreements sometimes provide that there shall be paid for the business in-
terest, the amount at which it is valued for inheritance tax purposes. The
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Appraisal
Appraisal is sometimes thought of as a method of valuation. But
most businessmen prefer to avoid the uncertainties with respect to the
amount of their obligations under a future appraisal.
Estate Tax Valuation
The problem of valuation is a frequent subject of tax litigation.
The Internal Revenue Code provides for a determination of the value
of all items in a decedent's estate as of the date of death, or one year
after death.82 The regulations83 provide that the value shall be the fair
market value which it defines as ". . . the price at which the property
would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller,
neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having
reasonable knowledge of relevant facts. The fair market value of a
particular item of property includible in the decedent's gross estate
is not to be determined by a forced sale price . . . ." The regulations
make specific reference to good will and the need for evaluation of
good will.
s*
Clearly, it is easier to fix values during lifetime through the means
of an agreement than to meet the requirements of the regulations.
Moreover, a careful reading of the regulations suggests that Revenue
Agents are encouraged to accept values fixed in an agreement for the
sale of the decedent's estate. This is in accord with the long estab-
lished practice of accepting, for estate tax purposes, values fixed by
survivor purchase agreements. 5 Even if the value fixed by the agree-
ment is not binding for estate tax purposes, it will, nevertheless, be
taken into consideration in arriving at the true value. 6
method defeats one of the indirect benefits to be derived from the agree-
ment, namely, the fixing of value for tax purposes. The tail would be wagging
the dog. Moreover, since disputes with the tax authorities with respect to
valuation may keep the matter open for a long time, the purchase and sale
of the business interest after death would be delayed.
82 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2031 and 2032.8 3 TREAs. REG. § 20. 2031-1(b).
84 TREAs. REG. § 20. 2031-3, which refers to partnerships and proprietorships,
states in part that "Special attention should be given to determining an ade-
quate value of the good will of the business in all cases in which the decedent
has not agreed, for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth, that his interest passes at his death to, for example, his surviving
partner or partners." TREAs. REG. § 20. 2031-2 deals with the values of stocks
and bonds.
85 RABKIN AND JOHNsON, 2 FEDERAL INcOmE GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION § 52.11(1954), summarizes the law as follows (page 5291): "Where stock is subject
at the time of death to an agreement of sale, or is subject to another's option
to purchase at a specific price, the fair market value is limited to such price.
• . . It is, of course, obvious that the stockholders in a closely held corporation
may employ this method to prevent an excessive valuation of each stock-
holder's interest. It has been held that the tax avoidance of the contract does
not affect its validity. ."
86 Spitzer v. Comm., 153 F. 2d 967 (8th Cir. 1946). This case involves the valu-
ation of stock for gift tax purposes. The court considered the effect of an
agreement for the purchase and sale of a deceased's interest at death. While
the court said that the agreement was not binding for gift tax purposes, it
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Fixing Value by Agreement
In order that the value fixed by agreement be accepted, certain
conditions must be met: The agreement must be based on considera-
tion and not be a substitution for testamentary disposition. 7 It must
be binding and not merely in the form of mutual options.8 It must
restrict the sale of the business interest during lifetime at a price
higher than that fixed in the agreement. If the foregoing tests are
met, the fact that the value fixed by the agreement is less than the fair
market value at the time of death is immaterial.5 9
indicated that it would consider the value fixed in the agreement as being
one of the factors in the determination of value for gift tax purposes.
87 Murphy v. Murphy, 217 Mass. 233, 104 N.E. 466 (1914); In re Fieux's Estate,
241 N.Y. 277, 149 N.E. 857 (1925); McKinnon v. McKinnon, 56 Fed. 409
(C.C.A. Mo. 1893).
88 Armstrong Estate v. Comm., 146 F. 2d 457 (7th Cir. 1944) ; Cowles v. State
of Wash., 219 P. 2d 964 (Wash. 1950); Helen S. Delone, 6 T.C. 1188 (1946),
acq. 1946-2 Cums. BULL. 2; Estate of Mathews v. Comm., 3 T.C. 525 (1944).
The purchaser must have an enforceable irrevocable option for the valuation
to be accepted for estate tax purposes.
s9 In Wilson v. Bowers, 57 F. 2d 682 (2nd Cir. 1932), three stockholders entered
into a buy and sell agreement whereby the selling price of their stock was one-
fourth the market value. The court found an enforceable option. In Lomb
v. Sugden, 82 F. 2d 166 (2nd Cir. 1936), it was held that the agreed price
of approximately $70 a share prevailed for estate tax purposes when the fair
market value was $100 a share. In Helvering v. Savage, 297 U.S. 106 (1936),
an income tax case, the cost basis of stock was not its fair market value but
the lower price at which the issuing corporation had an option under a binding
contract to repurchase the stock. In Comm. v. Bensel, 100 F. 2d 639 (3rd
Cir. 1938), where the son had an option to purchase his father's stock, the
court upheld the option price even though it only amounted to approximately
one-tenth of the fair market price. In Estate of Mitchell v. Comm., 37 B.T.A.
1 (1938), no transfer of stock was permitted without a prior offer to the
other party to the agreement at a price determinable under the instrument.
Thus, the value controlled for estate tax purposes. In Estate of Childs v.
Comm., 147 F. 2d 368 (3rd Cir. 1945), the court accepted the option price
of $10 instead of the actual value of $100 for estate tax purposes because
of restrictive provisions in the agreement.
It should be noted, however, that an option to purchase need not be of
indefinite duration after a death. Thus B may be given the option to pur-
chase A's interest at a fixed price for 90 days after A's death. Broderick v.Gore, Executor, 244 F. 2d 892 (10th Cir. 1955). Since the ceiling price at
A's death was the agreed amount, that amount will govern for estate tax
purposes. Furthermore, such options may exist between family members
and still retain their binding effect. May v. McGowan, 194 F. 2d 396 (2nd
Cir. 1952).
If A has the option to sell his business interest to B at a fixed price at
any time during his life, or if A's estate is given such option right, A's
business interest will be included in his estate at the fair market value atA's death. The reason for this is clear, since A or his estate may sell to a
third party at the fair market value. However, even if A does not have the
right to sell to a third party, his interest will be included in his estate at its
fair market value for the reason that A or his estate may never sell such inter-
est. Louise S. Schultz, 14 B.T.A. 419 (1928), Michigan Trust Co. et al., 27
B.T.A. 556 (1933). Thus it is important to realize which party has the option.
If the purchaser has the exclusive option to buy at a fixed price, that price
is the value of the interest and will govern for estate tax purposes. See
Rev. Rul. 54-76, 1954-1 CuM. BULL. 194. If the seller has the option to sell
at a fixed price, his interest will be included in the seller's estate at its fair
market value.
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The new estate tax regulations," in speaking of valuation, provide
that ". . . little weight will be accorded a price contained in an option
or contract, under which the decedent is free to dispose of the under-
lying securities at any price he chooses during his lifetime .... " They
further provide that even if there were a restriction on transfer during
the lifetime of the decedent, the agreed value will not control for estate
tax purposes unless ".... the agreement represents a bona fide business
arrangement and not a device to pass the decedent's shares to the na-
tural objects of his bounty for less than an adequate and full considera-
tion in money or money's worth . . . ." Thus, the parties to a survivor
purchase agreement, especially if related, must undertake the burden
of establishing that the agreement was negotiated in good faith, repre-
sents a real business transaction, and was not a substitution for a
testamentary disposition. When such a burden is met, the value fixed
by an intra-family agreement will be accepted.91
Alternate Valuation Date
Under Section 2032 of the Code the value of the business interest
may be "pegged" for estate tax purposes. This section permits the
estate of a decedent to be valued as of a date one year after death.
If any asset is sold within the year, it must be valued at the moment
for which it was sold. Hence, if a business interest is actually sold
during the year after death, in a bona fide transaction, the selling price
will "peg" the value for estate tax purposes-if the anniversary valu-
ation date is used. If the date of death is used, a subsequent bona fide
sale will very likely establish value.
Life Insurance in Valuation
Life insurance proceeds must be reckoned with in the scheme of
valuation, particularly if the decedent's interest is purchased by the
partnership or corporation. Specifically, the problem is whether the
proceeds will be included as an asset of the business for the purpose
of determining value. While the proposed estate tax regulations 2
contained language to the effect that under certain circumstances the
proceeds would be considered not only for valuation purposes but for
the purpose of determining whether the agreement was bona fide, the
final regulations9" eliminated such provisions. From this, and from
9 0 TREAS. REG. § 20.2031-2 (h).
91 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2 (h), established a presumption of consid-
eration when the parties to a survivor purchase agreement were strangers.
This presumption has been eliminated from the final regulations.
92Proposed Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1 (c) (6) read in part: "However, if the
insurance is owned by or payable to the partnership or corporation, or a trust
created by it or for its benefit, the proceeds of insurance are considered as
an asset of the partnership or corporation for the purposes of, first, de-
termining whether the agreements were supported by full and adequate con-
sideration in money or money's worth, and, second, determining the value
of the deceased's interest or share if the agreement is not considered to
have been entered into in good faith and at arm's length."
9s TREAs. R . § 20.2042-1.
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the basic case law, the conclusion may be drawn that if the agreement
is valid and binding, and fixes a price, the insurance proceeds will be
disregarded.
However, if a valid and binding agreement is not in existence, it
is fair to assume that now, as in the past,9 4 an attempt will be made
to include the proceeds as assets for valuation purposes. Even under
such circumstances, there is the possibility of contending that the loss
to the business of the individual insured should be offset against the
proceeds received by virtue of his death.95 In any event, valuation
should be covered by agreement, wherever life insurance is used,
whether a complete redemption is involved, or a partial purchase
under Section 303.
State Rules Differ
The foregoing discussion has related to valuation for federal estate
tax purposes. Many states96 however, do not follow these rules. In
general, they hold that the fair market value is to be taxed regardless
of the existence of a bona fide binding agreement fixing a different
value for buy out purposes.
CONCLUSION
The survivor purchase agreement is an effective instrument for pre-
probate business planning. Whether the equity or cross purchase ap-
proach is used depends on the facts and tax aspects of each case.
Wherever possible, life insurance should be used for funding purposes.
The agreement will, obviously, be only as sound as the ability of the
purchaser to make the required payments. The services of a corporate
trustee usually strengthens the arrangement. Tax problems will be
minimized if the instrument follows well established and recognized
patterns.
94 Estate of V. A. Blair, 4 B.T.A. 959 (1926); A. S. Kennedy, et al., Exrs.,
4 B.T.A. 330 (1926).
95 Estate of S. A. Scherer, B.T.A. Memo. Op. Dec. 11, 371-A, 42 B.T.A. 1480
(1940). One case has held that the proceeds of the insurance policy received
upon the death of an officer should be decreased by the loss to the company
resulting from the officer's death in valuing its stock. Newell v. Comm., 66
F. 2d 103 (7th Cir. 1933).
96 See: 1 FED. EST. & GIFT TAX REP. Paragraph 1202.08 (1958).
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